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Beyond Blood and Borders: 
FINDING MEANING IN BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 
D. Carolina Núñez† 
INTRODUCTION 
Several decades ago, Alexander Bickel asserted that 
citizenship in the United States was (and ought to be) nothing 
more than a theoretical distinction with little practical value. 
“[W]e live under a Constitution to which the concept of 
citizenship matters very little indeed,”1 he wrote. Under Bickel’s 
view of the Constitution, the government protected the rights of 
persons, rather than the rights of citizens: “It remains true that 
the original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a 
government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and 
held itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its 
relations with people and persons, not with some legal construct 
called citizen.”2 For Bickel and others, the Constitution, which in 
its pre-amendment form maintained silence on the definition of 
citizenship and scarcely even mentioned the term, limited very 
few rights to citizens.3  
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. I am grateful for the insights and comments offered on prior drafts by 
RonNell Andersen Jones, Kif Augustine-Adams, Shima Baradaran, Teneille Brown, 
Wendy Gerwick Couture, Brigham Daniels, Lisa Grow Sun, Sarah Haan, Christopher 
Lasch, Michelle McKinley, Kim Pearson, Addie Rolnick, Jeff Schwartz, and Jane 
Yakowitz Bambauer. Many thanks to my research assistants, Garrett Beeston, Josh 
Bishop, Melanie Grant, and Megan Flager for their excellent work.  
 1 Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 369, 387 (1973). 
 2 Id. at 370. In contrast to Bickel’s approval of citizenship’s relative lack of 
importance in his perception of the Constitution, several scholars lament what they see 
as the devaluation of citizenship in the United States. See, e.g., PETER J. SPIRO, 
BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 6-7 (2008); Peter H. 
Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989). 
 3 Bickel, supra note 1, at 369. As noted by Bickel, prior to the Reconstruction 
amendments, the Constitution’s treatment of citizenship was essentially limited to a 
bestowal of the naturalization power to Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the 
requirement that the offices of President, id. art. II, § 1, Congressman, id. art. I, § 2, 
and Senator, id. art. I, § 3, be filled by citizens, and the citizen’s guarantee against a 
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Bickel’s conclusions about the importance of citizenship 
have not carried over into the popular or political estimation of 
citizenship. It turns out that citizenship—as well as the type and 
strength of an individual’s claim to citizenship—matters a great 
deal, at least in public rhetoric.4 Being a citizen in the United 
States connotes belonging to and engaging in its society.5 
Citizens are wanted insiders, while noncitizens are tolerated 
outsiders at best and uninvited pariahs at worst. In many 
settings, public rhetoric contemplates only “citizens” and “illegal 
aliens.”6 In this binary conception of membership, the “citizen” is 
a desirable, integral part of our national polity, while an “illegal 
alien” is an uninvited intruder. The “citizen” contributes and 
participates, while the “illegal alien” consumes and depletes.7  
  
state’s abridgement of privileges or immunities, id. art. IV, § 2. Bickel, supra note 1, at 
369. As a result of the Constitution’s guarantees of rights to “persons” and “people,” 
aliens, regardless of immigration status, have enjoyed a variety of constitutional rights 
while in the United States. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (holding 
that undocumented children are entitled to the same public education that their 
documented and citizen counterparts are entitled to); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 
U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (extending the reasoning of Yick Wo to the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that aliens 
within the United States are entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 4 Quite illustrative of the increasing interest in an individual’s claim to 
citizenship is the public scrutiny of Barack Obama’s birth certificate in relation to the 
requirement that the President be a natural born citizen of the United States. See Dan 
Pfeiffer, President Obama’s Long Form Birth Certificate, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 27, 
2011, 8:57 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/27/president-obamas-long-
form-birth-certificate. This is not to suggest that the public inappropriately demanded 
U.S. citizenship of the president; the Constitution clearly requires as much. U.S. 
CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 4. Rather, the unusual and intense focus on the details of the 
president’s birth certificate combined with opponents’ expressed suspicions of the 
president’s loyalty and legitimacy illustrate the strong connection between citizenship 
and membership. Nothing less than citizenship could quell the perception of “otherness” 
that injected itself into public debate about the president. See Editorial, A Certificate of 
Embarrassment: The president is Finally Forced to React to a Preposterous Political Claim 
About His Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
04/28/opinion/28thu1.html (characterizing the challenges to the president’s citizenship as 
“a proxy for those who never accepted the president’s legitimacy, for a toxic mix of 
reasons involving ideology, deep political anger and, most insidious of all, race”).  
 5 Justice Warren characterized citizenship as “nothing less than the right to 
have rights.” See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 63 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). 
 6 See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word “Citizen” in 
Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557, 1557 (2008) (exploring the use of 
the word “citizen” in judicial opinions and commentary on the Fourth Amendment as 
coterminous with person or people and arguing that such usage exacerbates bias 
against immigrants). 
 7 This binary conception of membership even carries over into court opinion 
discussions of fundamental constitutional rights, with opinions often characterizing 
rights that are not explicitly linked to the concept of citizenship as rights of “citizens.” 
See, e.g., id. at 1576-77. 
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As the rhetorical gap between citizenship and alienage 
widens, the rules by which the United States awards birthright 
citizenship have come under scrutiny, especially as they relate 
to unauthorized immigration.8 The Fourteenth Amendment, 
which provides that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States,”9 has historically served as a broadly inclusive guarantee 
of citizenship for virtually all children born within U.S. 
territory.10 This bestowal of citizenship based on birth within 
U.S. territory is a form of jus soli—that is, the right of the soil or 
land. Scholars and politicians, however, have increasingly 
advocated withholding jus soli citizenship from the children of 
undocumented immigrants.11 The current, inclusive understanding 
  
 8 Marc Lacey, On Immigration, Birthright Fight in U.S. Is Looming, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html; 
Ed Hornick, Is the Next Immigration Fight Over “Anchor Babies”?, CNN ONLINE (Apr. 28, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/04/28/anchor.baby/index.html. 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 10 Some widely accepted exceptions to this broad inclusivity have been the 
children of foreign diplomats, prisoners of war, and prior to 1924, American Indians 
living under the tribal rule, see Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), all of whom have 
been interpreted as being insufficiently “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 171 (1996). In one sense, these classes of persons 
may be said to be outside the territory of the United States by a legal fiction derived 
from the immunities these classes derive from treaty or international law. See id.  
 11 These proposals and academic arguments take two forms. Some have 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States,” does not obligate the United States to confer citizenship on the 
children of undocumented immigrants because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” 
of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, proponents of this view have 
proposed bills to statutorily define “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as including only 
the children of legal permanent residents and citizens. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK & 
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITY 116 (1985). Many bills operate on the assumption that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require birthright citizenship to the U.S.-born children of most 
aliens. E.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2(b) (2011); A Bill 
To Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act To Limit Citizenship at Birth, Merely 
by Virtue of Birth in the United States, to Persons with Citizen or Legal Resident 
Mothers, H.R. 126, 111th Cong. § 1(a) (2009); Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 
1868, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009); Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. 
§ 3(a) (2007). These legislative efforts have varied in their details but generally provide 
that the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is fulfilled only if the child is born to a U.S. citizen mother or permanent 
legal resident mother, a U.S. citizen father or permanent legal resident father who 
meets additional criteria, or to an alien serving in the armed forces. See id. Other 
proponents of denying birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented 
immigrants, however, concede that the Fourteenth Amendment may indeed provide for 
birthright citizenship to all children born in the United States (with some 
aforementioned exceptions, see supra text accompanying note 10) and therefore call for 
an amendment to the Constitution to exclude anyone not born to a U.S. citizen, legal 
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of birthright citizenship, proponents have argued, incentivizes and 
even rewards unauthorized immigration.12 Indeed, because U.S. 
citizens over twenty-one years of age may begin the immigration 
process for their alien parents,13 aliens could potentially immigrate 
without authorization, have a child, and then wait for their 
“anchor babies” to come of age and secure legal residency.14 The 
proposed remedy is to deny the U.S.-born children of 
undocumented immigrants citizenship in the United States based 
on their parents’ lack of U.S. citizenship or status as a legal 
permanent resident. Such a conception of citizenship derives from 
jus sanguinis—the inheritance of citizenship through blood 
(rather than through place of birth).  
Though unsuccessful thus far, these proposals have 
spurred vigorous debate on the original meaning and purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. More broadly, and more 
relevant to this article, however, they offer insight into the 
popular conception of “membership” in the national community 
and the mechanisms by which we select those members.15 
Membership is an intuitive term—much of our ordering of the 
universe depends on the notion of membership. We are 
members of fitness clubs, farming cooperatives, and political 
parties, among many other things, and our membership in 
these institutions guarantees certain benefits. Members of 
fitness clubs enjoy the right to use fitness club equipment. 
Members of farming cooperatives have the privilege of 
consuming the vegetables harvested by the cooperative. 
Members also bear burdens and obligations. Fitness club 
members pay dues and may be expected to act in accordance 
with club rules, while farming cooperatives may expect 
members to help raise crops, allow crops to be raised on their 
own property, or buy a “share” of the venture. 
  
permanent resident, or alien actively serving in the U.S. military. See Joint Resolution 
Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of United States Relating to United 
States Citizenship, S.J. Res. 2, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 12 See Jennifer Medina, Arriving as Pregnant Tourists, Leaving with American 
Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/us/ 
29babies.html. 
 13 See Immigration and Nationality Act, sec. 1, § 201(b), 79 Stat. 911, 911 
(1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)). 
 14 See Lacey, supra note 8. For many, this concern also extends to temporary, 
though legal, visitors to the United States. Medina, supra note 12.  
 15 Michael Walzer’s seminal book, Spheres of Justice, analyzes justice in 
various spheres, including the spheres of education, free time, kinship and love, and 
what he refers to as “membership,” which here I have labeled citizenship or national 
polity. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY xi-xv, 3, 31 (1983).  
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Every organization, whether formal or not, has a 
mechanism for selecting its members. Ideally, the mechanism 
sorts those who are well-suited for membership in the 
organization from those who are not. One way of doing that 
would be to rely on a very individualized analysis of potential 
members to determine whether each candidate will fulfill his 
membership obligations, remain loyal to the organization, etc. 
This, however, would be very time consuming in the case of a 
large organization, whose representatives must make hundreds 
or even thousands of membership decisions. Instead, individuals 
responsible for making decisions about membership frequently 
refer to factors that are more easily and quickly measured. For 
example, a college might use an applicant’s high school grades 
and aptitude test scores to determine whether the applicant is 
likely to succeed in college. Although this is not a perfect 
indicator of the candidate’s likely success, it is a useful proxy.  
Legal rights are privileges for the members of a more 
abstract “club.” The decision of whether and to what extent an 
individual enjoys legal rights is ultimately a determination of 
that person’s membership. The right to citizenship is no 
different. Citizenship and its attendant benefits, as I explain in 
this article, are the privileges of membership in the national 
polity. Who gets citizenship and—perhaps more importantly—
who does not get citizenship shapes the meaning of citizenship 
itself. Thus, the rules and proxies by which citizenship is 
distributed warrant close analysis.  
The calls for a move away from a territorial conception of 
citizenship toward a status-based conception of citizenship 
evidence a shift in the way legislators, scholars, courts, and 
others understand membership and belonging. More abstractly, 
the proposed shift from a territorial to a status-based approach 
to citizenship implies an ongoing inquiry into the adequacy of 
various proxies for membership. After all, there is nothing 
magical about a child’s geographic location at birth or the status 
of the child’s parents. In fact, they are, in the most genuine 
sense, mere accidents of birth. Rather, we look to these proxies 
to help us assess something more substantive but less 
measurable: whether an individual “belongs.” 
My purpose in this article is to analyze birthright 
citizenship and proposals to deny citizenship to the U.S.-born 
children of undocumented immigrants in the context of the 
changing meaning of membership. While scholars have 
vigorously debated the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, none has examined jus soli and jus sanguinis as 
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proxies for more substantive indicators of membership. Neither 
have scholars evaluated those proxies’ effectiveness in 
approximating the qualities for which they serve as proxies.  
In this article, I argue that the move from a territorial 
conception of citizenship toward a status-based conception of 
citizenship parallels a broader trend in which courts and 
legislators are decreasingly distributing rights and privileges 
on the basis of territorial presence. I argue, however, that the 
distribution of citizenship based on status (or more accurately, 
parents’ status) fails to account for the substantive indicators of 
membership and belonging for which territorial presence at birth 
stands proxy. Although I concede that birthright citizenship, as a 
whole, must be distributed based on proxies—after all, it is 
impossible to evaluate an individual’s substantive eligibility 
and desirability for citizenship at the moment of birth—I argue 
that territorial presence, though imperfect, is a more accurate 
indicator of membership than parents’ status. As I explain in 
this article, rather than measure an individual’s substantive 
indicators of membership, a status-based approach further 
removes the membership inquiry from the substantive basis of 
membership in the national polity. Moreover, a status-based 
approach threatens to create a cast of modern-day “illegitimate” 
children—children who, on account of their parents’ status, 
remain outside the law of their birthplace despite their de facto 
membership in the community. 
To reach these conclusions, I begin with a discussion of 
membership in Part I. I discuss several competing approaches 
to membership employed in U.S. law, including a territorial, 
status-based, and “post-territorial” approach.16 I draw attention 
to the territorial and status-based approaches’ reliance on 
proxies—namely, geographic location and status—to determine 
membership and compare them to the post-territorial approach’s 
more direct reliance on the individual’s actual ties to the 
surrounding community and submission to the state’s imposition 
of obligations and duties. I then briefly explore the trajectory of 
courts’ distribution of membership rights to aliens in the United 
States outside the context of citizenship to illustrate 
territoriality’s generally waning hold on U.S. treatment of 
aliens in favor of the post-territorial approach. 
  
 16 For a detailed discussion of this emerging post-territorial approach, see D. 
Carolina Núñez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and 
Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 818-27, 830-32 (2010). 
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In Part II, I examine citizenship law in the context of 
the territorial and status-based approaches to citizenship. I 
analyze the historical trajectory of membership approaches in 
U.S. citizenship law, highlighting the strong role that the 
territorial approach has played and continues to play. I discuss 
court opinions that make individual determinations of U.S. 
citizenship, as well as the legislative history and circumstances 
surrounding categorical grants or rejections of citizenship. 
Acknowledging courts’ and legislatures’ use of territorial presence 
as a proxy for substantive indicators of membership, I distill the 
substantive factors for which territorial presence has served as 
a proxy in order to evaluate, in Part III, whether the territorial 
model continues to effectively approximate those factors today.  
Part III discusses the citizenship of children of 
undocumented immigrants through the lens of the substantive 
factors identified in Part II. I assert that these substantive 
indicators of membership are generally better approximated by 
looking toward a child’s country of birth rather than the status 
of the child’s parents, especially in the context of undocumented 
immigrants living in the United States. I acknowledge that the 
use of a territorial model in the birthright citizenship sphere 
defies the movement away from the territorial model described 
in Part I. I argue, however, that in the birthright citizenship 
sphere, where only the territorial or status-based models are 
available for use, the territorial model best fulfills the mandates 
of the post-territorial model. In essence, I propose that—perhaps 
counterintuitively—the territorial model operates much like the 
post-territorial model in the context of birthright citizenship. 
I. MEMBERSHIP 
Perhaps more than any other legal construct, citizenship 
captures the essence of membership. But membership 
encompasses much more than citizenship. In fact, decisions 
about membership inhere in most forms of social and legal 
ordering. Membership is a powerful concept that shapes 
individuals’ identity, underlies the conferral of benefits, and 
influences the imposition of obligations.17 
Much of our identity is tied to the concept of 
membership. We are members of families, political parties, 
professions, cultures, churches, and many other groups. Often, 
  
 17 Portions of Part II track and summarize my prior discussions of membership. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Núñez, supra note 16, at 819-26, 830-31. 
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when we introduce ourselves to others, we identify ourselves as 
belonging to something. In different settings, we highlight 
different memberships. An individual might be a lawyer at a 
cocktail party, a city council member at a political convention, a 
grandmother at a wedding, and a member of the Navajo tribe 
at a meeting of the National Congress of American Indians. 
Membership matters on a very personal level—it facilitates 
and signals fundamental aspects of identity. 
Beyond shaping an individual’s sense of identity and 
belonging, the concept of membership has a very concrete effect 
on the rights, privileges, and benefits that individuals receive. 
Ultimately, decisions about who receives goods (tangible and 
abstract) are decisions about membership. Members have 
privileges that nonmembers lack. Fitness club members enjoy 
access to fitness equipment, farming co-op members enjoy fresh 
produce, and sports team members enjoy camaraderie and 
competition. It is this access to membership privileges that 
makes membership particularly appealing. 
Membership, however, denotes more than benefits and 
privileges; perhaps equally as important, membership also 
implies an obligation. Fitness club members pay dues, farming 
co-op members donate time and effort to raising crops, and 
sports team members physically contribute to the team’s 
efforts. Because membership benefits are reserved exclusively 
for the members of their respective groups, individuals are 
willing to undertake membership obligations.  
Every club has a mechanism for selecting its members. 
In some cases, membership may depend on an individual’s 
similarity to other members of the club. For example, a shared 
language or set of customs might be enough to secure membership 
in a cultural club, while shared beliefs may secure membership in a 
religious organization. Often, membership depends on the 
likelihood of an individual undertaking and fulfilling her 
membership obligations once she becomes a member. This, 
however, can be difficult to predict. A credit card company, for 
example, expects its cardholders—or members—to repay the 
company for purchases they make with their credit card. 
Because an individual’s actual future performance is impossible 
to measure ex ante, member selection often requires reference to 
factors that are more easily measured and that indicate the 
individual’s likelihood of fulfilling her future obligations as a 
member. The credit card company will review the candidate’s 
financial history to determine whether she will, in the future, 
pay her bills. This is not a direct measure of whether the 
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candidate will actually pay her bills. Rather, the candidate’s 
past payment history is a proxy—and usually a very accurate 
proxy—for her ability to make future payments. 
Legal rights and privileges are also benefits of 
membership in particular, although more abstract, clubs. 
Employees have access to workers’ compensation benefits, 
adult citizens have voting privileges, and sixteen-year-olds may 
obtain driver’s licenses. As with the more pedestrian examples 
of membership discussed above, the act of including someone 
also entails an inherent act of exclusion. The unemployed do 
not enjoy workers’ compensation benefits, noncitizens may not 
vote,18 and young children cannot drive. The process of sorting 
members from nonmembers presupposes the existence of 
nonmembers. Exclusion is a byproduct of inclusion. 
Sorting members from nonmembers in the context of 
legal benefits and rights can be especially challenging. Not only 
is it difficult to define the club—or sphere of membership—to 
which a legal privilege attaches, but it is nearly impossible to 
measure whether an individual in fact displays whatever 
characteristics or qualities are important to that sphere of 
membership. For example, what qualities do we hope licensed 
drivers will possess? Most would answer, among other things, 
that all drivers should be law-abiding, possess good judgment, 
be vigilant, and have the ability to remain focused. Since it is 
impossible to know ex ante whether an individual will 
exemplify those qualities while driving, the question becomes 
what proxies will best approximate these qualities. Potential 
proxies might include age, driving test score, or parental 
certification of time spent driving under supervision, but none 
will provide a perfect metric. These same questions arise in 
every sphere of membership. What, exactly, should qualify an 
individual as a member of the club that distributes the legal 
right in question? Who is a member? Or, perhaps more 
importantly, who is not? Should each individual be evaluated 
separately to determine whether he should be admitted into 
the club at issue? Is there a good way to measure an 
individual’s fitness for membership? 
When it comes to aliens’ access to rights and benefits, 
several approaches to membership have evolved in the United 
  
 18 For an account of changing access to the voting franchise, see Pamela S. 
Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1345, 1345 (2003) (“The history of right to vote [sic] in America is one of 
expansion and contraction, of punctuated equilibria, rather than gradual evolution.”). 
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States. These membership models provide a sorting 
mechanism—a way of determining who is and who is not a 
member—for the distribution of membership rights. Two 
proxy-based membership models have historically played a 
significant role in the distribution of rights. A territorial 
approach to membership distributes rights and privileges 
based on an individual’s geographic location, while a status-
based approach looks to an individual’s legal status (in this case, 
immigration status). A third, less proxy-focused membership 
model seems to be developing. Some courts are using what I have 
elsewhere called a “post-territorial approach”19—that is, an 
approach that looks to the underlying rationales of territoriality—
to distribute rights among individuals. All of these membership 
paradigms are in tension with each other and arise in various 
areas of U.S. law. It is against this background that the current 
debate about citizenship for the children of undocumented 
immigrants has unfolded.  
A. The Territorial Model: The Meaning of Place 
1. Membership and Borders 
The territorial model of membership draws the line 
between members and nonmembers along the state’s borders.20 
Individuals on the inside of the border belong, and those on the 
outside do not.21 Strict territoriality ignores an individual’s 
  
 19 See supra note 17. 
 20 See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 6-8 (dividing approaches to the distribution 
of constitutional rights into membership approaches, mutuality approaches, universality, 
and “global due process”); Linda S. Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the 
Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 390-92 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bosniak, Being Here] (comparing the territorial and status-based models of membership); 
see also WALZER, supra note 15, at 41-42; Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: 
The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. 
REV. 955, 1031 (1988) [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership].  
 21 Though this model appears simple in writing, it can be difficult to apply in 
practice. It is not always clear where a state’s territory begins and ends. Guantanamo 
Bay, for example, is not a part of the United States, but it is, for many important 
purposes, controlled by the United States. The Supreme Court ultimately held that 
Guantanamo Bay was sufficiently under U.S. control to extend habeas rights to enemy 
combatants being held there. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Courts have also held that individuals who are 
unquestionably inside U.S. borders are outside its borders for purposes of the 
distribution of certain rights and privileges. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), an alien had arrived from abroad at Ellis Island in 1950 but 
was denied admission to the United States on security grounds and detained at Ellis 
Island for almost two years without a hearing. Id. at 208-09. When the claimant 
argued that his detention was a violation of due process, the Supreme Court treated 
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community ties, sense of identity, legal status, and ethnicity. 
Simple in theory and predictable in its result, territoriality 
merely asks whether an individual is present within the state’s 
territory.22 Jus soli provides a good example of strict territoriality 
and is particularly relevant to this article. Under jus soli, 
individuals born within a state’s territory are citizens of the 
state at birth.23 Mere presence within a state’s territory at the 
moment of birth guarantees this right. In the United States, the 
current application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause conforms to this territorial pattern. In fact, much of U.S. 
law employs a territorial approach to the distribution of rights.24 
For example, a territorial approach governs undocumented 
children’s rights to public education in the United States.25 
Under Plyler v. Doe,26 presence within the United States entitles 
undocumented children to the same free public education that 
their U.S.-citizen counterparts enjoy.27 In both the jus soli and 
public education examples, an individual’s parentage, 
immigration status, loyalty to the state, sense of identity, 
likelihood of remaining within the state’s boundaries, and 
ability and willingness to contribute to the state are irrelevant 
to the inquiry. The only relevant inquiry is whether the 
individual is physically present on U.S. soil at the time the 
membership right at issue is distributed. 
2. Territorial Presence as a Proxy 
Territoriality’s apparent disregard for these and other 
factors has raised questions about its rationale. Is mere 
presence within a state’s territory a good enough reason to 
count a particular individual as a member entitled to full 
membership rights? Clearly, physical presence within a state’s 
territory—standing alone, and viewed in the abstract—means 
very little. Rather, being within a territory represents 
something more meaningful—that is, physical presence within 
  
him as if he had not yet set foot in the United States: “In sum, harborage at Ellis 
Island is not an entry into the United States.” Id. at 213. 
 22 See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 394. 
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 24 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 978 (2002) 
(“[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to run 
for federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all of the other rights are written 
without such limitation.”). 
 25 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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a territory is a proxy for substantive traits and characteristics that 
are desirable in a member. Commentators have offered several 
possible indicators of membership for which territorial presence 
serves as a proxy. Close analysis, however, reveals that territorial 
presence is not a consistently effective measure for these possible 
indicators of membership, especially in an increasingly globalized 
world of cross-border communication and transactions. 
a. Mutuality of Obligation 
Territorial presence within a state’s boundaries might 
serve as a proxy for an individual’s acceptance of jurisdiction 
over her.28 The notion is that an individual, by being present 
within a state’s borders, acknowledges the state’s exclusive right 
to impose obligations upon her.29 This idea stems from 
Westphalian sovereignty, in which a nation-state exerts complete 
and exclusive jurisdiction over individuals within its territory.30 
This territorial jurisdiction superseded the medieval practice of 
overlapping fealty owed to feudal lords and ecclesiastical leaders. 
In a Westphalian system, an individual owes duties to the state 
rather than to individuals who might be geographically 
distant.31 Thus, an individual’s location is the ultimate 
determinant of her obligations.32  
This territorial sense of jurisdiction requires a territorial 
notion of membership, or so the argument goes, because a 
nation-state must provide corresponding membership rights and 
benefits to the individuals on whom it imposes obligations. That 
is, the state owes individuals within its territory full 
membership rights as a matter of mutuality of obligation 
  
 28 See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 108-09 (describing a conception of the U.S. 
Constitution based on mutuality of obligation); Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 408. 
 29 See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 108-09. 
 30 Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2508-
11 (2005) (tracing territoriality back to the Peace of Westphalia). 
 31 For a piece challenging the conventional view that the Peace of Westphalia 
single-handedly established a territorial world order, see Stéphane Beaulac, The 
Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 181 (2004). 
 32 See M.S. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius, in 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 391, 393 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed., 1994) 
(“The treaties of Westphalia enthroned and sanctified sovereigns, gave them powers 
domestically and independence externally.”). In addition to the Westphalian 
international norms that constrain a state’s ability to act outside of its borders, 
practical considerations play an important role. Logistics and cultural and social 
limitations all constrain the exercise of power beyond the state’s borders. See Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 259, 269 (2009). 
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because those individuals are subject to all of the duties imposed 
by the state. 
Although the mutuality-of-obligation rationale for 
territoriality is sound in a formalistic sense, it does not account 
for the modern reality that states sometimes impose 
obligations on individuals outside their borders.33 The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),34 for example, prohibits U.S. 
nationals living outside U.S. territory from engaging in certain 
practices. Despite being geographically outside the United 
States, individuals subject to the FCPA are nonetheless subject 
to U.S. law.35 Strict territoriality also fails to account for the 
practice of offering selective immunity to individuals within 
state territory.36 Foreign diplomats are exempt from some of the 
obligations the state imposes on other individuals within its 
boundaries. In that sense, diplomats do not accept the host 
state’s full jurisdiction over them by virtue of their mere 
presence.37 In each of these scenarios, territorial jurisdiction does 
not accurately describe the source of individuals’ obligations. As 
a result of these incompatible situations, territoriality is an 
inconsistent proxy for mutuality of obligation. 
b. Community Ties 
Others have argued that territorial presence is a proxy 
for ties between an individual and the surrounding community.38 
They argue that an individual is most likely to develop ties to 
the institutions and individuals physically near her.39 These 
  
 33 Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (1996). 
 34 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), d(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. §§ 78dd-2 & 78dd-3; Raustiala, supra note 30, at 2510 (describing 
the principle of sanctuary, where a location is “plainly within a prince’s territorial 
realm yet into which secular law could not reach,” as an example of lapses in territorial 
sovereignty). See generally Neuman, supra note 33. 
 37 See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 2510. 
 38 Joseph H. Carens, On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, 30 BOS. 
REV., Summer 2005, at 3, 16, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR30.3/carens.php 
(“Whatever their legal status, individuals who live in a society over an extended period 
of time become members of that society, as their lives intertwine with the lives of 
others there. These human bonds provide the basic contours of the rights that a state 
must guarantee; they cannot be regarded as a matter of political discretion.”); see also 
Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 404. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE 
UNITED STATES 11 (2006) (describing an affiliations-focused approach to immigration 
based on “the ties [immigrants] have formed in this country”). 
 39 Carens, supra note 38. 
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ties, in turn, foster commitment and loyalty to the surrounding 
community, and they increase the likelihood the individual will 
contribute to that community. Likewise, the surrounding 
community forms ties with the individual such that the 
surrounding community depends on the individual’s membership. 
This rationale for territoriality is intuitive, but it can 
seem outdated in a modern world. After all, electronic 
communication and ease of travel reduce the need for 
interaction between individuals living in geographic proximity 
and allow individuals to form strong ties across state 
boundaries.40 In addition, the community ties rationale does not 
parallel territoriality’s binary world of members and 
nonmembers.41 Even assuming that territorial presence results 
in affiliations between the individual and the surrounding 
community, strict territoriality does not account for the varying 
depth and type of ties any one individual might have to the 
community. In a membership system truly based on community 
ties, individuals with more numerous and significant 
connections to the surrounding community would presumably 
possess a stronger claim to membership rights than those who 
have fewer and weaker ties. 
Although territorial presence seems to intuitively correlate 
with community ties such that territorial presence would be an 
effective proxy for those ties, there are many situations, as 
described above, in which that would not be the case. 
c. Community Preservation 
Territoriality might also help preserve the character of 
the surrounding community.42 This rationale is also based on 
the idea that territorial presence serves as a proxy for ties 
between the individual and the surrounding community. It is 
not, however, the individual’s fitness for membership that is at 
issue under this rationale but rather the preservation of the 
community’s egalitarian character.43 Scholars argue that excluding 
  
 40 For a critique of the relationship between proximity or “place” on the one 
hand and identity and responsibility on the other, see Doreen Massey, Geographies of 
Responsibility, 86B GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER 5 (2004), available at http://oro.open.ac.uk/ 
7224/1/geographies_of_responsibility_sept03.pdf. 
 41 See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 405-06. 
 42 The community preservation rationale has also been called the anti-caste 
or anti-subjugation rationale. See id. at 392-95; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed. 1988).  
 43 See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 392-95. 
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individuals within the community from membership would 
create a subclass of nonmembers that would degrade the 
community’s character.44 It is important to note, however, that 
this rationale for territoriality is not one about fairness to 
individuals. Instead, it is about the nature of the community. 
In fact, under the community preservation rationale, unequal 
treatment of individuals would not be justified, even by consent 
of the affected individuals, because the community would 
nonetheless suffer from the creation of a subclass.45 
This argument in favor of territoriality is perhaps the most 
appealing of the three discussed here. It suggests that, even when 
territorial presence may not reflect mutuality of obligation or 
community ties, inclusion may nevertheless be warranted because 
exclusion might bring unwanted changes to a society. 
B. Membership Based on Status 
Rights may also be distributed based on an individual’s 
status with respect to the polity.46 Under this approach, citizens 
enjoy all the rights and privileges offered by the polity, while 
those without any legal status enjoy fewer rights and 
privileges.47 In the United States, voting rights follow this 
pattern: only citizens may vote, while others may not.48 The U.S. 
welfare system also conforms to the status-based approach.49 
Citizens have access to many benefits that legal permanent 
residents do not enjoy, while legal permanent residents enjoy 
more benefits than do tourists and other temporary visa holders.50 
  
 44 Owen Fiss has linked the Fourteenth Amendment to principles of 
community preservation. The Amendment, he argues, is “a statement about how 
society wishes to organize itself, and prohibits subjugation, even voluntary subjugation, 
because such a practice would disfigure society.” Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, 
23 BOS. REV., Oct./Nov. 1998, at 5, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR23.5/Fiss.html; 
see also Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 7 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1795–1801, at 303 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1896) 
(“[T]he friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first 
experiment; but the citizen will soon follow . . . .”). 
 45 See WALZER, supra note 14, at 62. 
 46 See NEUMAN, supra note 10, at 6-7; Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390. 
 47 Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390. 
 48 For a description of a historical territorial-based approach to voting rights, 
see Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current 
Prospects for Change, 21 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 477, 479 (2000). 
 49 See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 528-31 (6th ed. 2008).  
 50 See id.  
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The status-based approach to membership is also a 
proxy-based approach. An individual’s status as a citizen, 
standing alone, means very little. Rather, status is a measure 
for something more meaningful. Status might represent the 
polity’s consent to that individual’s participation in the 
community or the individual’s willingness to abide by legal 
norms.51 Status might also serve as a proxy for loyalty, community 
ties, or sense of obligation to the state.  
Unfortunately, status does not always provide an accurate 
approximation of some of these factors. Like territoriality, the 
status-based approach to membership relies on an imperfect 
proxy. For example, a citizen is not necessarily more loyal than 
a legal permanent resident. Likewise, a legal permanent 
resident does not necessarily have more ties to the surrounding 
community than does a long-time undocumented resident. 
Thus, status is not a consistently effective proxy for these and 
other more substantive indicators of membership. 
C. Post-Territoriality 
As an alternative to proxy-based systems of rights 
distribution, courts and legislatures have also distributed rights 
under a more principled, functional approach.52 Rather than 
referring to a proxy like territorial presence or status, courts and 
legislatures can instead directly measure an individual’s ties to 
the surrounding community, sense of obligation to the United 
States, and other fundamental indicators of membership.53 I call 
this a post-territorial approach because it values the rationales 
underlying the territorial model while divorcing itself from a rigid 
adherence to territorial presence. Post-territoriality is a 
developing, potential successor to territoriality.54  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boumediene v. Bush 
serves as a useful example of the post-territorial approach.55 
There, the Court held that Guantanamo Bay detainees had the 
right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the 
Constitution.56 Specifically rejecting the argument that the 
detainees’ location outside U.S. territory excluded them from 
  
 51 See Bosniak, Being Here, supra note 20, at 390. 
 52 See Núñez, supra note 16, at 842-47. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. at 848. 
 55 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 56 See id. at 770. 
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petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court analyzed 
several factors before arriving at its conclusion.57 The Court 
focused on the actual power the United States exerted over the 
detainees and the corresponding obligations the United States 
must afford.58 In other words, the Court looked directly to 
mutuality of obligation, rather than to a proxy for mutuality of 
obligation, in order to determine the detainees’ membership for 
purposes of habeas corpus review. 
Cancellation of removal, the process by which an alien 
facing removal from the United States may instead obtain 
permission to remain as a permanent resident, provides an 
example of a legislative use of the post-territorial approach.59 
Under relevant law, an undocumented immigrant is eligible for 
cancellation if, among other requirements, she has been 
present in the United States for ten years, has been of good 
moral character, and can show that removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying 
relative in the United States.60 Rather than simply ask whether 
the individual has the requisite status to remain in the United 
States, the Immigration and Nationality Act focuses on more 
direct measures of an individual’s membership, including ties 
to the surrounding community and the extent to which the 
community depends on the individual.61 
D. Aliens and Membership 
For a U.S. citizen living in the United States, the 
difference between the status-based approach and the territory-
  
 57 See id. at 752 (“[N]o law other than the laws of the United States applies at 
the naval station” even though Cuba retains technical sovereignty over Guantanamo.); 
see also Neuman, supra note 32, at 259 (exploring Boumediene’s functional approach to 
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution). 
 58 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769, 771 (contrasting de jure sovereignty with 
practical sovereignty and finding that “[i]n every practical sense Guantanamo is not 
abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United States” because the 
detainees at issue “are held in a territory that, while technically not part of the United 
States, is under the complete and total control of our Government”). 
 59 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b (2006)) (providing a mechanism by which removable aliens may remain in the 
United States as legal permanent residents). 
 60 See id. § 240A(b). 
 61 The cancellation of removal statute admittedly uses proxies—length of stay 
in United States, see id. § 240A(b)(1)(A), and hardship to U.S. relatives, see id. 
§ 240A(b)(1)(D), for example—to measure membership. The cancellation statute, 
however, is fairly characterized as post-territorial in nature because it rejects proxies that 
are no longer useful in favor of a more textured analysis of the individual’s membership. 
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based approach is merely theoretical. After all, whether it is 
because of her citizenship or her presence within the United 
States, the individual receives membership benefits. A U.S. 
citizen in the United States is entitled, for example, to the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, either because she is 
present in the United States or because she is a U.S. citizen. 
But for an alien, the decision of which membership paradigm 
governs has a very palpable effect on the rights the alien enjoys. 
For example, an undocumented immigrant in the United States 
might find that her presence within the United States is simply 
not enough to secure Fourth Amendment rights and that her 
status precludes her from those rights.62 Similarly, for 
individuals living outside the United States, the membership 
model applied matters. Indeed, citizenship might secure a right 
for an individual despite her absence from U.S. territory. 
Thus, the applicability of U.S. law to aliens within the 
United States and to individuals outside of the United States 
provides two perfect fields in which to study the evolving 
trajectory of membership models in the United States. An 
examination of that trajectory reveals a trend away from strict 
territoriality. As presence within the United States becomes 
less accurate in reflecting an individual’s ties to the United 
States, courts and legislatures are looking to other indicators of 
membership. In some instances, legal status now secures a 
certain right or privilege. In other instances, courts and 
legislatures have attempted to directly measure an individual’s 
community ties and sense of obligation to the United States. That 
is, in some areas of law, the status-based approach is now 
competing with the post-territorial approach to displace the 
more traditional territorial model. As a result, presence within the 
United States no longer guarantees certain membership rights, 
and presence outside the United States does not necessarily 
foreclose an individual from receiving membership rights. 
The tension between competing membership paradigms 
arises in a variety of spheres. In the labor and employment 
context, for example, a status-based approach to worker rights 
has slowly begun to displace the territorial model.63 The result 
is a fractured system in which some courts tether rights to 
  
 62 See, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. 
Utah 2003). 
 63 See generally Núñez, supra note 17, at 849 (arguing that under a post-
territorial approach, undocumented immigrants are members of the employment 
sphere entitled to all the rights and remedies available to documented workers). 
2013] FINDING MEANING IN BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP 853 
 
lawful immigration status or citizenship while others tie them 
to territorial presence.64 This disconnect is apparent in Title VII 
discrimination cases,65 state employment law and tort claims,66 
and workers’ compensation claims.67  
State legislatures have adopted different membership 
models in their treatment of undocumented college students, as 
well. Some states offer in-state tuition prices to all students 
who are residents of the state, regardless of their immigration 
status,68 while other states require in-state undocumented 
  
 64 For example, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 
(2002), the Supreme Court held that an undocumented worker could not recover 
backpay, wages that would have been earned but for an illegal termination, under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id. at 159-60. The decision opened the door for 
significant encroachment of a status-based approach into the labor and employment 
law sphere. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.  
 65 See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896-97 (S.D. 
Tex. 2003). But see Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(suggesting that Hoffman is not applicable to Title VII claims). 
 66 See, e.g., Garcia-Lopez v. Bellsouth Telecomm., No. 1:08CV1397-LG-RHW, 
2010 WL 1873042, at *6 (S.D. Miss. May 7, 2010) (holding that an undocumented 
immigrant’s lost wage and earning capacity claims are barred); Veliz v. Rental Serv. 
Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1334-35 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that the estate of 
an undocumented worker injured in a work-related accident could not recover lost U.S. 
wages against the forklift manufacturer); Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 473 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that a claimant’s lack of authorization to work 
precluded both economic and non-economic damages for her illegal termination); see 
also Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, No. 01-1241-JTM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19780, 
at *16-17 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2003) (suggesting that an undocumented worker may be able 
to recover lost wages, but only at the prevailing wage in the individual’s country of 
origin); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005). But see 
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding 
that undocumented status does not prevent a worker from recovering compensatory 
damages for state employment law violations). 
 67 See, e.g., Xinic v. Quick, 69 Va. Cir. 295 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005). But see Pontes 
v. New Eng. Power Co., No. 0300160A, 2004 WL 2075458, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 
19, 2004) (holding status is not relevant in worker’s compensation claim); Sanchez v. 
Eagle Alloy, Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (limiting award of lost wages to 
compensate only for time period during which employer did not know of employee’s 
undocumented status); Cherokee Indus. v. Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798 (Okla. Ct. App. 2003) 
(suggesting that undocumented status may render alien ineligible for specific remedy 
of vocation rehabilitation or medical treatment by a specific doctor). 
 68 Thirteen states have enacted such laws: California, see CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 68130.5 (West 2002); Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-29 (2011); Illinois, see 
110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/7e-5 (2009); Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a 
(West 2004); Maryland, see MD. CODE ANN. § 15-106.8 (West 2012); Nebraska, see NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-502 (West 2006); New Mexico, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1 
(2005); New York, see N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(h)(8) (McKinney 2012); Texas, see TEX. EDUC. 
CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2001); Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2002); 
Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012 (West 2003); Oklahoma (overturned in 
2011), see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3242 (West 2007), invalidated by Thomas v. Henry, 260 
P.3d 1251 (Okla. 2011); and Wisconsin (repealed in 2011), see WIS. STAT. § 36.27, repealed in 
part by 2011 Wis. Legis. Serv. 32 § 994L (June 26, 2011). The Rhode Island Board of Regents 
has adopted policies allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition at state schools, 
though no legislative act requires it. See S. 5.0, R.I. Board of Governors for Higher Education, 
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students to pay the higher, out-of-state tuition prices.69 States 
have also differed on whether undocumented status should 
foreclose students from enrolling in post-secondary state 
schools at all.70 
Another area in which the territorial model competes 
with a status-based model lies in the debate over whether to 
allow undocumented immigrants to apply for driver’s licenses. 
A majority of states have now passed laws that require proof of 
legal residency or citizenship in order to obtain a driver’s 
license.71 A handful of states, however, continue to allow all 
state residents, regardless of their immigration status, to apply 
for some form of driver’s license.72  
These examples highlight the waning importance of 
territorial presence. Being here, alone, is not enough. From the 
examples discussed above, it appears that a status-based 
approach is quickly overtaking the previously dominant 
territorial approach. The tension, however, between the 
territorial model’s broad inclusivity of individuals within the 
borders and the status-based model’s categorical exclusion of 
undocumented immigrants has led to a post-territorial approach 
in the sphere of constitutional law. Although territorial presence 
once guaranteed protection under the Constitution, with little 
explanation, recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that 
something more substantive than territorial presence triggers 
constitutional coverage.  
For much of U.S. history, territorial presence weighed 
heavily in the distribution of membership rights. Commentators 
  
Sept. 26, 2011, available at http://www.ribge.org/residency1for2012.pdf; see also 
Undocumented Student Tuition: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/ 
educ/undocumented-student-tuition-state-action.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 69 At least four states legislatures specifically foreclose undocumented 
immigrants from in-state tuition prices: Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1803 
(2006); Colorado, see COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-76.5-103 (2011); Georgia, see GA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-3-66 (2008); and Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 21-14-11 (West 2011). South 
Carolina, Indiana, and Alabama also prohibit undocumented students from enrolling in 
state postsecondary schools. See Undocumented Student Tuition, supra note 68. 
 70 South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-101-430 (2008); and Alabama, see 
ALA. CODE § 31-13-8 (2011); 2011 Ala. Acts 535 § 8, also prohibit undocumented 
students from enrolling in state postsecondary schools. 
 71 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3153(D) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 257.307 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 483.290 (West 2011). 
 72 Washington, New Mexico, and Utah allow undocumented immigrants to 
apply for some form of a driver’s license. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-9 (West 2011); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-205(8) (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.20.021, 
46.20.091 (West 2003).  
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attribute this inclusive tradition to Yick Wo,73 where the 
Supreme Court held that the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”74 Indeed, this 
reasoning found favor in subsequent cases exploring the 
Constitution’s application to aliens.75  
Of course, the necessary corollary to a rule that distributes 
rights based exclusively on presence inside the borders is the 
denial of rights to individuals on the outside. Indeed, being 
outside the United States has, for much of U.S. history, foreclosed 
protection under many constitutional provisions.76 The 
Constitution, as it turned out for those outside the border, could 
“have no operation in another country.”77 
More recently, this territorial approach to membership 
has undergone a transformation toward post-territoriality. 
Perhaps because territorial presence is not as accurate as it once 
was in predicting community ties or an individual’s sense of 
obligation to the surrounding community and polity, courts and 
legislatures have begun to look past territorial presence to 
more substantive factors. The Supreme Court’s opinion in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,78 for example, suggested 
that the Constitution only protects aliens who have “developed 
  
 73 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 74 Id. at 369. 
 75 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222-23, 230 (1982) (holding that the 
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide public 
education to undocumented children); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234-
35 (1896) (extending the reasoning of Yick Wo to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
 76 See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that a sailor, whom the 
court treated as a constructive U.S. citizen, employed on a U.S. merchant ship was not 
protected by the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury). The Insular Cases, 
which centered on whether the Constitution applied to U.S. territorial possessions such 
as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, also provide good examples of the exclusionary side 
of territoriality. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904); Hawaii v. 
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 198 (1903); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 
2 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 222 (1901). 
 77 In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464. 
 78 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Justices Kennedy, White, O’Connor, and Scalia joined 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, but Justice Kennedy also submitted his own concurrence, 
which diverged from the reasoning of the Court. As a result, courts and commentators 
have questioned the precedential value of what amounts to a plurality opinion. See 
Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1991); Randall K. Miller, The Limits 
of U.S. International Law Enforcement After Verdugo-Urquidez: Resurrecting Rochin, 
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 867 n.3 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 
YALE L.J. 909, 972 (1991). 
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substantial connections with this country.”79 Territorial 
presence, alone, was insufficient.80 The Court has also departed 
from strict territoriality in cases focusing on individuals 
outside the border—that is, absence from U.S. territory does 
not necessarily foreclose an individual from constitutional 
protection. For example, in Reid v. Covert,81 the Court held that 
U.S. citizens living abroad and convicted of murder by a U.S. 
military court were entitled to the right to a trial by jury after 
indictment by a grand jury.82 In Reid, the Court rejected the 
strict territorial approach of earlier cases in favor of a status-
based approach that focused on the individuals’ U.S. 
citizenship.83 More recently, in Boumediene v. Bush,84 the Court 
held that enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay were 
entitled to the writ of habeas corpus and the protections of the 
Suspension Clause.85 Enemy combatants were deemed “members” 
for purposes of habeas corpus review, not because of status or 
presence within U.S. territory, but because of a more substantive 
concern with, among other things, providing protections to those 
on whom the government imposes obligations.86 In evaluating 
substantive indicators of membership rather than categorically 
granting or denying rights based on territorial presence, Supreme 
Court opinions show a trend toward post-territoriality. 
The trend away from territoriality and toward post-
territoriality suggests an increased focus on the substance of 
membership. Though this trend represents an encouraging 
move away from proxy-based systems of membership that are 
both overinclusive and underinclusive,87 the trend toward post-
territoriality has not yet been developed in the sphere of 
citizenship law. And those who call for the abandonment of a 
  
 79 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271. 
 80 Id. at 271-72 (“[T]his sort of presence—lawful but involuntary—is not of 
the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country.”). 
 81 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 82 Id. at 32-33. 
 83 See id. at 5-6 (“[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts 
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. . . . When the Government 
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the . . . Bill of Rights . . . should not be 
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”). 
 84 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 85 See id. at 2277. 
 86 See D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented 
Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85 (2011) (arguing that 
Boumediene was decided under a post-territorial paradigm that focuses on the 
underlying rationales of territoriality). 
 87 See generally Núñez, supra note 17. 
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territorial conception of birthright citizenship have not advocated 
for a system of distributing citizenship that employs more 
accurate measures of membership. Rather, they seek to replace 
territorial presence with a different proxy: parents’ immigration 
status. In the remainder of this article, I argue that, when it 
comes to birthright citizenship, where inaccurate proxies are 
unavoidable, territorial presence is the more accurate indicator 
of membership and best fulfills the post-territorial objective of 
accurate and fair inclusion. 
II. CITIZENSHIP AND TERRITORY 
Citizenship in the United States is intimately related to 
territory. Virtually all U.S. citizenship rules require a 
connection to U.S. territory. Birthright citizenship under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,”88 is one of 
the most territorial conceptions of citizenship in the industrialized 
world. Even birthright citizenship rules for the foreign-born 
children of U.S. citizens incorporate a strong territorial 
component. In order to pass U.S. citizenship to their children born 
abroad, U.S. citizen parents must have lived or been physically 
present in the United States before the birth of the child.89 Thus, 
even U.S. birthright citizenship based on blood or inheritance—
known as jus sanguinis—is strongly territorial in nature. 
Naturalization laws also require a territorial connection to the 
United States, with most immigrants being required to have a 
continuous residence in the United States for the five years 
prior to naturalization.90 Beyond the residency requirement, 
naturalization rules also require an intending citizen to have 
been physically present in the United States for at least two 
and a half years before naturalization.91 
  
 88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 89 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006) (Two U.S. citizens may pass U.S. 
citizenship to children born abroad if one of the parents “had a residence in the United 
States” before the birth); id. § 1401(g) (A child born abroad to one U.S. citizen and one 
alien is a U.S. citizen only if, before the birth, the U.S. citizen parent “was physically 
present in the United States” for at least five years, two of which were after the parent 
was 14 years old); id. § 1409(c) (A child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother is a 
U.S. citizen only if the mother has been “physically present in the United States . . . for 
a continuous period of one year.”). 
 90 See id. § 1427(a). Those who immigrate as the spouse of a U.S. citizen may 
naturalize after three years of residency in the United States. See id. § 1430(a). 
 91 See id. 
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Citizenship’s relationship to territory has not, as it has 
in other aspects of U.S. law, given way to post-territoriality. 
Rather, it seems that exactly the opposite has occurred. U.S. 
citizenship began and evolved in the post-territorial climate of 
the American Revolution, where boundaries—both territorial 
and political—were shifting so profoundly that it was difficult 
to tether citizenship to them. As boundaries solidified, so too 
did citizenship rules.  
Below, I explore several junctures in U.S. history in 
which courts and legislatures asked the fundamental question—
who should be a citizen? I attempt to distill the substantive 
factors that motivated the answers to this question in order to 
evaluate, in Part III, the merits of using territorial presence at 
birth as a proxy for membership today. 
A. The Birth of American Citizenship 
The earliest U.S. citizens were those who became such 
after the British colonies in America declared independence in 
1776. With no clear rule demarcating the boundaries of 
citizenship, courts struggled to identify whether and when these 
individuals became U.S. citizens.92 What made a former British 
subject a citizen? When did British subjects become citizens? As 
courts sorted between citizens and noncitizens in the wake of the 
Revolution, they did not conform to rigid rules. Instead, more 
interestingly, courts looked to underlying rationales for the 
concept of membership. And in the course of that evaluation, 
an individual’s sense of allegiance to the United States and 
community ties, as indicated by territorial presence, played an 
important role.  
1. Post-Revolution Citizenship Cases 
Two Supreme Court cases, Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s 
Snug Harbour93 and Shanks v. Dupont,94 specifically dealt with 
the effects of revolution and U.S. independence on individual 
citizenship. In both cases, the Court focused on U.S. inhabitants’ 
“right of election”—that is, the right of selecting one’s citizenship 
  
 92 I use “U.S. citizen” here to refer both to citizens of the individual states 
and of the United States as a whole. Citizens of individual states, after all, were 
citizens of the United States. 
 93 Inglis v. Tr. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830). 
 94 Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830). 
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in the wake of a revolution.95 An individual exercised her right of 
election, not through a formal declaration, but rather through 
allegiance to a country as apparent from her actions. The 
Court’s decisions in Inglis and Shanks thus highlight some of 
the methods by which courts measured an individual’s 
allegiance and consequent citizenship. 
In each case, the Court’s analysis followed a similar 
pattern, although the application to each case’s details carried 
some nuance. First, the Supreme Court addressed the individual’s 
citizenship at birth under a simple jus soli rule.96 Second, the 
Court determined whether the individual, during and after the 
Revolution, had made an election to become a U.S. citizen.97 If 
the individual was not of age at the time of the Revolution, the 
Court assigned to the child whatever election the child’s parent 
had made on the child’s behalf.98 In both of these steps, 
territory played an important role; the location of an 
individual’s birth and later residence weighed heavily in the 
determination of citizenship. 
a. John Inglis 
In Inglis,99 the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 
John Inglis was not a U.S. citizen and therefore could not 
  
 95 Inglis, 28 U.S. at 121-22; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 255-56. See Respublica v. 
Samuel Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 53 (1781) (describing the right of election as 
available to individuals where one government “withdraw[s] from an old government, 
and erect[s] a distinct one”). 
 96 See Inglis, 28 U.S. at 120-21; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245. 
 97 See Inglis, 28 U.S. at 121-22; Shanks, 28 U.S. at 255-56. 
 98 In Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, Professor Mayton 
suggests that the Court’s willingness to tie a child’s citizenship to his or her parent’s 
citizenship evidences the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause original 
meaning: as a jus sanguinis rule. William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the 
Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221 (2008). While this article does not purport to 
identify the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth noting 
that the Court in post-Revolution citizenship cases does not purport to apply a jus 
sanguinis citizenship rule. Rather, the Court specifically holds that birthright 
citizenship is governed by the rule of jus soli. It is the child’s later election, which exists 
only during times of revolution or other political schism, that may be tied to the parent. 
That is, where the child did not have the capacity to legally make an election, the Court 
held that the parent’s election would serve as the child’s election as well. This is an 
important distinction in light of the factors the Court considered to determine the 
parent’s election. In every case, the parent’s choice of residence was determinative. In 
each case, the child lived with his or her parent. That is, the parent’s residence was 
also the child’s. A strict jus sanguinis rule relies on the parent’s citizenship, which is 
cast before a child is born and can be in a country to which a child has no physical 
connection.  
 99 Inglis, 28 U.S. at 99. 
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inherit real property located in the United States.100 Inglis was 
born in New York sometime before 1779.101 In 1783, Inglis left 
the United States with his father, an English royalist, for 
England.102 Inglis remained in England for two years and then 
took up residence in Nova Scotia, of which he became the 
bishop under the Church of England.103 
The Court recognized at the outset that the issue of 
citizenship was not just a matter of long-established citizenship 
rules:  
This question as here presented, does not call upon the court for an 
opinion upon the broad doctrine of allegiance and the right of 
expatriation, under a settled and unchanged state of society and 
government. But to decide what are the rights of the individuals 
composing that society, and living under the protection of that 
government, when a revolution occurs; a dismemberment takes 
place; new governments are formed; and new relations between the 
government and the people are established.104 
First, the court began with the “universally admitted” 
proposition that an individual born on American territory 
subject to British rule was born a British subject.105 In essence, 
the Court began with jus soli—that birth on British-governed 
territory would result in British citizenship. Unfortunately, the 
date of Inglis’s birth in New York was unclear. Since New York 
had been alternately occupied by British and American forces 
during the years when Inglis could have been born, the Court 
could not ascertain whether New York was a British colony at 
the time of Inglis’s birth.106 
In any event, jus soli was insufficient to resolve the 
issue of Inglis’s ultimate citizenship because, even if the British 
had governed the colonies at the time of Inglis’s birth, a new 
government controlled that same territory at the time of 
Inglis’s ability to inherit property. A new dimension of jus soli 
had to be explored—namely, whether jus soli ties an individual 
  
 100 Id. at 126-27. Because the date of John Inglis’s birth, which would have 
revealed Inglis’s citizenship at birth (depending on who controlled the territory in 
which Inglis was born), and Inglis’s age at the time when he could have made an 
election (which would dictate whether Inglis could make his own election or merely follow 
his father’s election), were uncertain, the Court reached this conclusion by evaluating the 
outcome based on several different hypothetical birth dates. See id. at 126.  
 101 Id. at 102-03. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 120. 
 105 Id. at 120-21. 
 106 Id. at 120. 
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to the territory of birth regardless of who exercises sovereignty 
over that territory, or whether jus soli ties an individual to the 
government that exercised sovereignty over that territory at 
the time of birth. 
The Court found that Inglis’s citizenship was not tied to 
either. Rather, Inglis had a “right of election.” Inglis’s 
nationality was not a mere function of formal legal rules, but 
rather the result of his allegiance, as demonstrated by his 
actions.107 Thus, the Court considered whether Inglis had, at 
some point after birth, become (or, if he had been born while 
his home was ruled by American forces, remained) an 
American citizen: 
The settled doctrine of this country is, that a person born here, who 
left the country before the declaration of independence, and never 
returned here, became thereby an alien, and incapable of taking 
lands subsequently by descent in this country. The right to inherit 
depends upon the existing state of allegiance at the time of descent cast.108 
The Court finally concluded that, regardless of whether 
the British controlled New York at the time of Inglis’s birth, 
Inglis had ultimately become a British subject by leaving New 
York for England and never returning.109 The Court also 
suggested that Inglis may have been a British subject, rather 
than an American citizen, before leaving the United States.110 
  
 107 Id. at 123. In his concurrence, Justice Story summed up this pragmatic, 
post-territorial approach:  
Under the peculiar circumstances of the revolution, the general, I do not say 
the universal, principle adopted, was to consider all persons, whether natives 
or inhabitants, upon the occurrence of the revolution, entitled to make their 
choice, either to remain subjects of the British crown, or to become members 
of the United States. . . . [E]ach case was left to be decided upon its own 
circumstances, according to the voluntary acts and conduct of the party.  
See id. at 159-60 (Story, J., concurring). 
 108 Id. at 121 (majority opinion). 
 109 Id. at 126-27. The Court analyzed Inglis’s “election” by considering three 
hypothetical dates of birth: birth prior to the Declaration of Independence, birth after 
the Declaration of Independence but prior to the later British occupation of New York, 
and birth during the British occupation of New York. Id. at 126. If born prior to the 
Declaration of Independence, Inglis was born a British subject and by leaving the 
United States, he elected to remain a British subject. Id. If born after the Declaration 
of Independence but prior to the subsequent British occupation, then Inglis would be 
too young to make his own election and would be assigned his father’s election to be a 
British subject. Id. If born during the British occupation of New York, Inglis was born a 
British subject and elected to remain a British subject by leaving the United States. Id. 
In any event, the Court noted, by ultimately leaving the United States and remaining 
in Britain, Inglis had elected to abandon any U.S. citizenship he had. Id. at 127. 
 110 Id. at 126 (“[H]is infancy incapacitated him from making any election for 
himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right 
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Inglis was likely too young to make an election during his time 
in the United States, and Inglis’s father, who was a royalist, 
would have elected British nationality for Inglis.111 
b. Ann Shanks 
An individual’s decision to remain in the colonies or 
leave them proved equally important in Shanks.112 There, the 
parties contested the citizenship of Ann Shanks both at the 
time of her father’s death and at the time of the treaty with 
Great Britain of 1794, which controlled whether her children 
could inherit land in South Carolina.113 
Shanks was born in South Carolina.114 Her father, 
Thomas Scott, supported the American cause.115 In 1781, 
Shanks married a British officer and later left South Carolina 
for England with her husband in 1782.116 After Shanks’s marriage 
but before her departure to England, Shanks’s father died.117 After 
raising five children in England, Shanks died in 1801. 
Justice Story, writing for the Court, concluded that 
Shanks was a citizen of South Carolina at the time of her 
father’s death,118 but she was not a U.S. citizen at the time of 
the treaty.119 The Court focused on Shanks’s “election” and 
“allegiance,” as evidenced by her voluntary residence in one 
country or another. 
With respect to Shanks’s citizenship on the date of her 
father’s death, the Court viewed Shanks’s residence in South 
Carolina as an important indicator of Shanks’s U.S. citizenship. 
Noting that Ann’s father “adhered to the American cause,” the 
Court reasoned, 
There is no dispute that . . . Ann, at the time of the revolution, and 
afterwards, remained in South Carolina until December 1782. 
Whether she was of age during this time does not appear. If she was, 
  
of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority; which never 
having been done, he remains a British subject.”). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246-47 (1830). 
 113 Id. at 243. 
 114 Id. at 244. 
 115 Id. at 245. 
 116 Id. at 244. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 245. 
 119 Id. at 246-47. 
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then her birth and residence might be deemed to constitute her by 
election a citizen of South Carolina.120 
That Shanks remained in the state of her birth when 
she came of age was a strong indicator of Shanks’s allegiance to 
that state. If she was not of age, then the evidence—that 
Shanks’s father was an American supporter—suggested that 
her father had nonetheless elected American citizenship for 
Ann.121 
According to the Court, the fact that Shanks had married 
a British subject before her father’s death could not change her 
  
 120 Id. at 245. 
 121 Id. at 247. Justice Story explained, “If she was not of age, then she might 
well be deemed under the circumstances of this case to hold the citizenship of her 
father; for children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the 
father, partake of his national character, as a citizen of that country.” Id. at 245. 
Justice Story’s statement appears to be directly at odds with Justice Thompson’s 
analysis in Inglis, decided in the same term as Shanks. In Inglis, Justice Thompson 
had begun with the “universally admitted” proposition that “all persons born within 
the colonies of North America, whilst subject to the crown of Great Britain, were 
natural born British subjects.” Inglis v. Tr. of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 
Pet.) 99, 120 (1830). Indeed, Justice Story, just a few paragraphs before referring to 
Ann’s father’s citizenship, had confirmed Inglis to be the Court’s complete statement of 
the relevant law. Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245 (“After the elaborate opinions expressed in the 
case of Inglis vs. The Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour . . . upon the question of 
alienage, growing out of the American Revolution; it is unnecessary to do more in 
delivering the opinion of the court in the present case, than to state, in a brief manner, 
the grounds on which our decision is founded.”). 
  While some have suggested that Justice Story’s assignment of American 
citizenship to Shanks despite her birth in a British colony is an endorsement of jus 
sanguinis, see, e.g., Mayton, supra note 98, at 222, an analysis of the specific facts in 
the case suggest otherwise. The Court could not have meant to endorse a conventional 
jus sanguinis rule of citizenship. If it had, then Ann could not possibly be a U.S. citizen. 
After all, her father was born in South Carolina prior to the Revolution and his parents 
were, in the best case scenario, born in the British colonies, and, in the worst case 
scenario, born in Britain or elsewhere. Were jus sangunis or jus soli controlling, Ann’s 
father would be a British subject (or a citizen or subject of whatever state his parents 
belonged to). But in Shanks, the Court found that Shanks would have been a U.S. 
citizen. This result was entirely a product of the doctrine of election, by which Shanks 
had a choice of nationality. If, however, Ann was not competent to make a choice 
because of age, then the Court would have to look to the father. Other than the place of 
his birth (in a British colony), the only information the Court mentioned about 
Shanks’s father was his political loyalty and his residence in South Carolina: “[H]er 
father adhered to the American cause.” Shanks, 28 U.S. at 245. It seems then, that in 
holding that Anne would have the citizenship of her father, the Court was not holding 
that Ann inherited her father’s original citizenship, but instead Shanks inherited her 
father’s election after the Declaration of Independence. This is very different from jus 
sanguinis, which ascribes citizenship on individuals through blood lines. Shanks’s 
“election” was a choice that she was entitled to make if competent to make the decision 
and that her father was entitled to make if she was not competent. 
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citizenship.122 Shanks’s association or legal ties to an individual 
did not involuntarily strip her of her elected citizenship.123 
On the question of Shanks’s citizenship after the date of 
her father’s death, the Court concluded that Shanks had 
ultimately become a British subject.124 Once again, voluntary 
residence in a country was determinative. That is, although 
Shanks’s marriage to a British officer did not dissolve her U.S. 
citizenship, her later decision to move to Britain did: “[H]er 
subsequent removal with her husband operated as a virtual 
dissolution of her allegiance, and fixed her future allegiance to 
the British crown.”125 Shanks’s decision to permanently leave 
the United States was an important—if not controlling—
indicator of her election to relinquish U.S. citizenship. 
c. Asa Kilham and Henry Gardner 
The importance of an individual’s physical attachment 
to territory heavily influenced the outcomes in several early 
state court cases, as well.126 In 1806, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court held that the claimant, Asa Kilham, who had 
been denied the opportunity to vote on the ground that he was 
an alien, was a citizen entitled to vote.127 Kilham was born in 
Massachusetts in 1754,128 but in 1775, he departed to 
Newfoundland.129 Nevertheless, he had always expressed 
loyalty to the American cause.130 In fact, he had refused to fight 
against the Americans during his return voyage to the United 
  
 122 Shanks, 28 U.S. at 246. 
 123 Of course, the Court’s dismissal of these arguments is also notable for its 
implications on gender and citizenship. For a discussion of the historical effect of a 
woman’s marriage on her citizenship, see Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian 
American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 
(2005). 
 124 Shanks, 28 U.S. at 247. 
 125 Id. at 246-47. The Court also found that, even if Ann’s move to Britain was 
not sufficient to dissolve her American Citizenship, it was, nonetheless, enough to 
establish her election to be a British subject. Id. at 249. 
 126 See Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 236 (1806); Gardner v. Ward, 2 
Mass. (1 Tyng) 244 (1805); Palmer v. Downer, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 179 (1801) (holding that 
a Massachusetts native who left the U.S. after the commencement of the Revolution 
and remained in British-ruled territory until his death became an alien); Moore v. 
Wilson’s Admin’rs, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 406, 408-09 (1837) (“Besides, the complainant 
has resided since 1780 within the United States, and has been twice married to 
American citizens, and she therefore is not an alien.”). 
 127 See Kilham, 2 Mass. at 262 (opinion of Parker, J.). 
 128 Id. at 236 (reporter’s commentary). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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States at great personal expense.131 In 1780, Kilham arrived in 
Massachusetts, where he joined the militia, attended town 
meetings, and engaged in a trade.132 The court affirmed his 
citizenship. “[H]e did not lose his rights as a citizen of the United 
States,” the court found. “His absence from his country was 
temporary, and was for the purpose of getting a livelihood.”133  
Less than a year before, the Massachusetts court also 
heard the case of Gardner v. Ward, in which the claimant’s vote 
had been disallowed for the same reason as Kilham’s.134 There, 
the court held that Gardner was a citizen despite a long absence 
from the United States.135 Because Gardner returned to Salem, 
“there having his domicile,” and joined in the American cause, 
“he was, of course, a citizen of the United States.”136  
2. Understanding the Meaning of Territory 
At first glance, these early post-Revolution cases appear 
to have been decided entirely on the basis of territorial 
presence and therefore seem to offer little insight into why the 
courts thought territorial presence was a useful metric for 
sorting citizens from noncitizens. But the courts’ decisions did 
not evaluate the individual’s history of arrivals and departures 
from the United States in a vacuum. The courts also took note 
of the individual’s (and his or her family’s) expressions of 
loyalty to the United States. In Inglis, for example, the fact 
that the claimant’s father was a royalist weighed against a 
finding of U.S. citizenship.137 In contrast, the Court found that 
Ann Shanks’s father supported “the American cause,” which 
weighed in favor of finding U.S. citizenship on the date of her 
  
 131 Id. at 236-37. As a result of his refusal, the officers of the ship confiscated 
his property. Id. 
 132 Id. at 237. 
 133 Id. at 262 (opinion of Parker, J.). 
 134 Id. at 262; Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 244, 244 (1805) (reporter’s 
commentary). 
 135 Gardner, 2 Mass. at 247-48 (opinion of Sewall, J.).  
 136 Id. at 150 (emphasis omitted). 
 137 See Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor’s Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 124 
(1830) (noting that the claimant’s father was “as much a royalist” and “that no man 
could be more so”); see also Kilham, 2 Mass. at 236-37 (noting the claimant’s frequent 
expressions of “his attachment to his native country” and refusal to fight against 
Americans); Gardner, 2 Mass. at 236 n.1 (commenting that the claimant had, during 
his absence from the United States, loaned money to American prisoners). 
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father’s death.138 In addition, the courts considered where the 
individual raised his or her family, with the Shanks Court 
specifically observing that Ann Shanks’s children had all been 
born in England.139 This fact was an indication of her election to 
eventually relinquish U.S. citizenship. The claimant’s integration 
into the community also played a role in the courts’ 
determinations. In Kilham, the court noted the claimant’s work 
as a carpenter, his voting history, and the fact that he was 
believed by his neighbors to have been temporarily outside the 
United States for legitimate purposes.140  
Not surprisingly, these facts correspond to the 
rationales of territoriality identified above in Part I.A.141 An 
individual’s loyalty and willingness to support the American 
cause are one side of the mutuality of obligation equation. As 
an individual takes on obligations to a state, the state is 
obliged to provide corresponding protections. Moreover, an 
individual’s willing integration into a community evidences 
community ties that ought to be recognized by continued 
inclusion in that community. The facts that the courts 
considered in these post-Revolution citizenship cases, combined 
with their correlation with mutuality of obligation and 
community ties, suggests that territorial presence served as a 
proxy for these more substantive indicators of membership. 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The question of who should be a citizen resurfaced 
during the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 Although 
this article does not purport to explore in detail the original 
  
 138 See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 245 (1830) (stating that 
Shanks’s father “adhered to the American cause” and therefore would have passed on 
that character to Ann if she were not of age at the time of the Revolution). 
 139 See id. at 244 (observing that Shanks had left five children, all born in 
England, at her death). 
 140 See Kilham, 2 Mass. at 237 (observing that the claimant had joined the 
local militia in Massachusetts, worked in his trade there, had voted at town meetings, 
and appeared to his neighbors to be genuine in his explanation for having been outside 
of the United States for some time); see also Gardner, 2 Mass. at 236 n.1 (taking 
account of the claimant’s continued connection with the United States during his 
absence through an agent, his transaction of business in Massachusetts upon return, 
and the community’s consideration of him as a citizen). 
 141 See supra text accompanying notes 22-44. 
 142 See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2893 (1866) (remarks of Sen. 
Reverdy Johnson) (“Who is a citizen of the United States is an open question.”). 
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intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment,143 an 
examination of the Amendment’s legislative history illustrates 
the tenacity of territoriality within the concept of American 
citizenship and highlights some of the substantive factors for 
which territorial presence served as proxy. 
The originally proposed Fourteenth Amendment did not 
include any citizenship language.144 It was not until after House 
adoption that Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan proposed a 
citizenship clause during the Senate debate of the Amendment: 
“[A]ll persons born in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
States wherein they reside.”145 Two concerns with the proposed 
language arose: First, the language would make citizens of the 
children of Chinese immigrants and “Gypsies.”146 Second, the 
language would make citizens of Native Americans living in 
U.S. territory.147 The discussion that surrounded these two 
issues once again highlighted the underlying rationales for a 
territorial approach to citizenship—a desire to recognize 
mutuality of obligation, account for community ties, and avoid 
the creation of a caste system. 
1. Children of Gypsies and Chinese as Citizens 
Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania, an objector to the 
Amendment, assured that Gypsies were a threat to his state. 
He described Pennsylvania’s struggle with 
a certain number of people who invade her borders; who owe to her 
no allegiance; who pretend to owe none; who recognize no authority 
in her government; who have a distinct, independent government of 
their own—an imperium in imperio; who pay no taxes; who never 
perform military service; who do nothing, in fact, which becomes the 
citizen . . . . They wander in gangs in my state. . . . If the mere fact of 
being born in the country confers that right, then they will have it; 
and I think it will be mischievous.148 
  
 143 For analyses of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, see Garrett 
Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 2010 AM. U. L. REV. 331 (2010); 
Mayton, supra note 98. 
 144 See Epps, supra note 143, at 353. 
 145 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2890 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Jacob 
Howard). 
 146 Id. at 2890-91 (remarks of Sen. Edgar Cowan). 
 147 Id. at 2894 (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). 
 148 Id. at 2890-91 (remarks of Sen. Edgar Cowan). 
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In essence, Senator Cowan described a group of people 
whom he perceived to be unwilling to subject themselves to 
U.S. sovereignty and therefore undeserving of citizenship. 
Though his remarks were undoubtedly colored by racial 
stereotypes, which he frequently articulated,149 his objection 
squarely raised questions of mutuality of obligation. 
The Chinese, argued Senator Cowan, were unfit for 
citizenship on account of being of “a different race, of different 
religion, of different manners, of different traditions, different 
tastes and sympathies.”150 Senator Cowan expressed concern for 
the State of California, believing the Chinese “may pour in 
their millions upon our Pacific coast in a very short time.”151 
“[I]s it proposed that the people of California are to remain 
quiescent while they are overrun by a flood of immigration of 
the Mongol race? Are they to be immigrated out of house and 
home by Chinese? I should think not.”152 
Senator John Conness of California, a proponent of the 
Amendment, agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
drafted, would indeed make citizens of the U.S.-born children 
  
 149 See, e.g., id. at 2891 (suggesting that citizenship should be open to people 
of the same “blood and lineage, people of the same religion, people of the same beliefs 
and traditions,” and referring to the white race as “the strongest”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. Interestingly, in these comments, Senator Cowan raised some of the 
same arguments that current proponents of a restrictive reading (or repeal) of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause have raised: that a territorial conception of 
birthright citizenship would allow people to immigrate in alarming numbers, that 
immigration would be hard to control, and that U.S. culture would be detrimentally 
affected. See Julia Preston, Citizenship From Birth Is Challenged on the Right, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/us/ 
politics/07fourteenth.html (quoting Senator Graham, a proponent of proposals to deny 
citizenship to the children of undocumented immigrants: “We can’t just have people 
swimming cross the river having children here—that’s chaos.”); Marc Lacey, Birthright 
Citizenship Looms as Next Immigration Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html (quoting 
Representative Duncan Hunter: “We’re just saying it takes more than walking across the 
border to become an American citizen. It’s what’s in our souls.”); Sandhya Somashekhar, GOP 
Push to Revise 14th Amendment Not Gaining Steam, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/07/AR2010080702605.html 
(discussing the sentiment that territorial birthright citizenship fuels increasing undocumented 
immigration). The parallel is even more striking in the rhetoric used outside mainstream 
media. See, e.g., Joe Guzzardi, Ending Birthright Citizenship Should be a Top Priority 
for Congress, GOPUSA.com (Jan. 14, 2013, 6:33 AM), http://www.gopusa.com/ 
commentary/2013/01/14/guzzardi-ending-birthright-citizenship-should-be-a-top-priority-
for-congress/ (“Many of these children will grow up without traditional American 
values, struggle to learn English, perform indifferently in school and only marginally 
contribute to society. Eventually, the U.S. could lose control over its demographic future.”). 
 152 Id. at 2890-91. 
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of Chinese immigrants and Gypsies.153 In response to Senator 
Cowan, he retorted, 
I beg the honorable Senator from Pennsylvania, though it may be 
very good capital in an electioneering campaign to declaim against 
the Chinese, not to give himself any trouble about the Chinese, but 
to confine himself entirely to the injurious effects of this provision 
upon the encouragement of a Gypsy invasion of Pennsylvania. I had 
never heard myself of the invasion of Pennsylvania by Gypsies . . . . 
 . . . I have lived in the United States for now many a year, and 
really I have heard more about Gypsies within the last two or three 
months than I have heard before in my life.154 
Senator Conness explained that, although the Chinese 
“are not regarded as pleasant neighbors,”155 they are 
docile, industrious people . . . . They are found employed as servants 
in a great many families and in the kitchens of hotels; they are found 
as farm hands in the fields; and latterly they are employed by 
thousands . . . in building the Pacific railroad. They are there found 
to be very valuable laborers, patient and effective.156 
Senator Conness’s remarks encapsulate the community ties 
rationale for territoriality. Chinese residents were an integral 
part of the community, at least with respect to the economy, 
and therefore were not to be excluded as nonmembers. 
Later, Senator Conness summed up why the U.S.-born 
children of Chinese immigrants should be regarded as citizens 
of the United States, entitled to all the rights and privileges 
afforded to citizens. He described the plight of the Chinese, who 
had been the subject of numerous anti-Chinese laws in 
California, including a prohibition on Chinese individuals 
testifying in court: 
The Chinese were robbed with impunity, for if a white man was not 
present no one could testify against the offender. They were robbed 
and plundered and murdered, and no matter how many of them 
were present and saw the perpetration of those acts, punishment 
could not follow, for they were not allowed to testify.157 
Here, Senator Conness raised a community preservation 
argument: he maintained that the Chinese should be afforded 
birthright citizenship because they would become a subclass of 
  
 153 Id. at 2892 (remarks of Sen. John Conness). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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the American population if they were not eligible for citizenship. 
Citizenship for everyone born within the territory would create a 
just, egalitarian society. 
After the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, the Supreme 
Court relied on a mutuality of obligation rationale in reaffirming 
the inclusion of Chinese children born in the United States within 
the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause. In 
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,158 the Supreme Court explained 
that a child born in the United States to alien parents was 
nonetheless a U.S. citizen because that child was born subject to 
U.S. power and therefore must be extended the corresponding 
protections of citizenship. “By this circumstance of his birth,” the 
Court reasoned, “he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which 
is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land; and 
becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that 
sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are 
included in the term ‘citizenship.’”159 
2. American Indians as Noncitizens 
The question of American Indian citizenship received 
more attention than the question of Chinese and Gypsy 
citizenship in the debates preceding the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Although there was apparent agreement 
that American Indians living under tribal rule should not be U.S. 
citizens, there was less certainty about how best to achieve that 
result. Senator James R. Dolittle of Wisconsin proposed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment include an exception from citizenship 
for “Indians not taxed,” who, under identical language in the 
1787 Constitution, were not counted for purposes of 
Congressional representation or tax apportionment.160 Senator 
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who had sponsored the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, took the floor to explain that the phrase 
was not necessary. Indians were not within the jurisdiction of 
the United States, he argued, because they were not subject to 
U.S. law: 
Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court? Are they in any sense 
subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no 
means. We make treaties with them, and therefore they are not 
  
 158 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 159 Id. at 663 (quoting Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 244, 244 n.1 (1805)). 
 160 See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866) (remarks of Sen. 
James Dolittle). 
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subject to our jurisdiction. If they were, we would not make treaties 
with them. . . . Do we pass a law to control them? Are they subject to 
our jurisdiction in that sense? Is it not understood that if we want to 
make arrangements with the Indians to whom he refers we do it by 
means of a treaty?  
 . . . . 
 . . . We cannot make a treaty with ourselves; it would be 
absurd.161 
For Trumbull, American Indians were effectively 
outside of U.S. territory. In fact, when asked whether American 
Indians were outside of U.S. jurisdiction merely as a “matter of 
pleasure on the part of the Government,” Senator Trumbull 
compared Indian territory to a foreign country. The United 
States could impose U.S. law on Indian tribes only to the extent 
it could “extend the laws of the United States over Mexico and 
govern her.”162 But American Indians who had left their lands 
posed a different question: “If they are there and within the 
jurisdiction of Colorado, and subject to the laws of Colorado, 
  
 161 See id. at 2893 (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). It was in this dialogue 
that Senator Trumbull defined “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as “not owing 
allegiance to anybody else,” id. at 1866, which commentators have since wielded in 
defense of a restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship 
clause. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 98, at 244-46. Trumbull, however, was speaking 
only of Indian populations, whom he viewed as quasi-separate polities:  
We have had in this country and have to-day, a large region of country within 
the territorial limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we do not 
pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of 
Indians roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we 
do not pretend to interfere with them. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2894 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). 
Senator Howard, also shared that sentiment:  
They have a national independence. They have an absolute right to the 
occupancy of the soil upon which they reside . . . . We have always recognized 
in an Indian tribe the same sovereignty over the soil which it occupied as we 
recognize in a foreign nation of a power in itself over its national domains. 
Id. at 2895 (remarks of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
 162 Id. at 2894. Senator Fessenden nonetheless maintained that Congress 
could enforce its laws in Mexico. Id. (remarks of Sen. William Fessenden). Senator 
Trumbull supposed that Congress could do so only if it had the physical power to 
enforce those laws, though it would be a “breach of good faith” to do so to Mexico and a 
breach of treaties to do so to American Indians. Id. (remarks of Sen. Lyman Trumbull). 
The acknowledgement that having power to enforce laws is one component of 
“jurisdiction” finds support in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene, in which the 
Court’s functional approach considered the ability to enforce law as a component of de 
facto sovereignty over a territory. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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they ought to be citizens; and that is all that is proposed.”163 
Ultimately, Senator Trumbull’s reasoning—which corresponds 
squarely to the mutuality of obligation rationale for 
territoriality—prevailed, and the “Indians not taxed” language 
was not adopted.164 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment just as Senator Trumbull had proposed—as 
excluding American Indians. In Elk v. Wilkins, the Court held 
that American Indians were not citizens at birth because they 
were born members of an independent political community and 
owed allegiance to individual tribes.165 Justice Gray, writing for 
the majority, referred to Indian tribes as “alien nations, 
distinct political communities” whose members “were not part 
of the people of the United States” at the time of the drafting of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and who the United States could 
not impose obligations on.166 Indian tribes, in some respects, 
were not part of U.S. territory, and their members thus were 
not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, as 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause.167 
C. Indian Citizenship After the Fourteenth Amendment 
Although American Indians were outside the reach of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, they were the subjects of a series 
of federal legislative acts that granted American Indians 
citizenship in a piecemeal fashion. Many American Indians 
gained citizenship through the Dawes Act.168 The Dawes Act 
allowed the federal government to divide tribal land and grant 
it to individual tribe members.169 With the individual grant of 
land, the government essentially dissolved tribal sovereignty 
over that land, effectively incorporating it into U.S. territory. 
  
 163 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2893 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull). 
 164 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 165 See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 166 Id. at 99-100. 
 167 Id. at 109-10. Justices Harlan and Woods dissented on the grounds that 
the claimant was a U.S. citizen because he had severed relations with his tribe and had 
“surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States” by “becoming . . . a bona 
fide resident of the State of Nebraska.” Id. at 120-21 (Harlan & Woods, JJ., dissenting). 
The majority, however, noted that it was birthright citizenship that was at stake and that 
the individual’s condition at birth was what mattered. Id. at 102-03 (majority opinion). 
 168 Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). 
 169 See id. 
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In return for the subjection to U.S. law, the Dawes Act made 
citizens of any American Indian granted land under its 
provisions.170 During the Senate debates, important themes 
regarding territoriality resurfaced. The Senators expressed 
concern over notions of mutuality of obligation, community ties, 
and community preservation. 
First, proponents were interested in subjecting 
American Indians to U.S. law and allowing them to protect 
their individual grants of land through access to courts. 
Senator Maxey, who strongly supported granting citizenship 
with each allotment, argued that granting citizenship was an 
important protection that must accompany the grant: 
“[Citizenship] gives the Indian holding land in severalty a place 
in the United States courts to vindicate his right to his land and 
protect himself in the enjoyment of his land.”171 Without 
citizenship, American Indian land owners would be at the mercy 
of U.S. law without access to the protections of citizenship. 
Second, proponents of the Dawes Act felt that an 
allotment of land would bring American Indians into the 
“civilized life.” Though racially charged, this discussion 
amounted to an evaluation of the likelihood that an allotment 
of land would result in an individual’s integration within the 
surrounding community.172 
Finally, proponents of the Dawes Act were concerned 
with the negative effects of denying citizenship to American 
Indians who were living among citizens. Such a distinction 
between American Indians and white citizens would lead to the 
subjugation of the American Indians. Senator Chace observed,  
I confess that I am at a loss to understand how gentlemen reconcile 
to themselves and to their own sense of right and justice that 
anomalous condition that the people of the United States have 
occupied so long toward the Indian tribes. How with our system of 
laws, based as it is upon the Declaration of Independence, which 
announces “that all men are created equal,” that they are endowed 
“with certain inalienable rights, . . .” this people can go on generation 
  
 170 See id. 
 171 17 CONG. REC. 1627, 1633 (1886) (remarks of Sen. Samuel Maxey). 
 172 See, e.g., id. at 1632 (remarks of Sen. Henry Dawes) (“[The Act] is to make 
citizens of the United States of those Indians and those only who have . . . adopted the 
habits of civilized life.”); id. (“[W]e do it in order to encourage any Indian who has 
started upon the life of a civilized man and is making the effort to be one of the body-
politic in which he lives.”). 
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after generation holding in subjection this handful of a race of 
men . . . .173 
Senator Maxey joined in Senator Chace’s concerns and 
added that a system that denied citizenship to American 
Indians while at the same time granting citizenship to 
similarly situated white individuals would be detrimental to 
everyone.174 He compared the potential grant of citizenship to 
American Indians to the grant of citizenship to prior slaves: 
The policy of the United States Government when they liberated the 
slaves was first to make them citizens . . . . [A]nd why? Because they 
were not isolated, they were not dissociated, they were not separated 
from the white citizens of this country; but they were mixed among 
them, they were our neighbors. As long as we and our 
descendants . . . shall live in this country, just that long will the 
colored man and his descendants live in this country, and their 
fortunes, their destinies will run side by side with ours.  
 . . . [T]he better educated the colored man is the more he 
respects himself, the better citizen he makes, and the better it will 
be for both colored and white.175 
It was not until 1924 that Congress passed a broad 
grant of citizenship to Native Americans born “within the 
territorial limits of the United States.”176  
The examples of judicial and legislative grants of 
citizenship discussed in this section demonstrate the 
importance of mutuality of obligation, community ties, and 
community preservation in the citizenship inquiry. These 
examples show that an individual’s presence within U.S. 
territory has played an important role in determining whether 
those factors would be well served by a grant of citizenship. 
Having isolated the factors that historically played important 
roles in the concept of citizenship, one question remains: How 
can we best account for those factors today? Does a territorial 
conception of birthright citizenship effectively account for 
them? Would a status-based approach be more effective today? 
In Part III, I use the factors—the substantive indicators of 
membership distilled in this part—to evaluate the efficacy of 
the territorial and status-based membership models in the 
specific context of birthright citizenship. 
  
 173 Id. at 1633-34. 
 174 Id. at 1634 (remarks of Sen. Maxey). 
 175 Id. 
 176 Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 253 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)). 
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III. FINDING MEANING IN CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP BY 
PROXY 
It is interesting that, in the realm of birthright 
citizenship, U.S. law has adhered to a very territorial 
membership model despite the broader trend toward the more 
nuanced, substantive measure of membership offered by post-
territoriality. Certainly, presence in the United States at birth 
does not necessarily ensure that the individual bears whatever 
characteristics or qualities are desirable in a citizen. 
Territoriality remains, however, the primary model that 
describes the U.S. approach to birthright citizenship.  
Of course, the failure of post-territoriality to filter into 
birthright citizenship rules makes intuitive sense. Undertaking 
a substantive evaluation of the community ties, loyalty, and 
sense of obligation of every individual born with some claim to 
U.S. citizenship would be impractical. In fact, it would be 
impossible, since very little beyond a person’s physical and 
genetic qualities and physical location can be discerned about a 
person at birth. As a result, territory has persisted as a proxy 
for more substantive indicators of membership.  
The only possible alternative to the territorial model, in 
light of the limited information known about a child at birth, 
evaluates the qualities or status of the parents. Because a 
substantive evaluation of all parents giving birth to children in 
the United States is impractical, distribution of citizenship 
based on parents’ citizenship is the only viable alternative to 
territoriality in the birthright citizenship context. In this part, 
I argue that territoriality is the appropriate model to apply to 
children of undocumented immigrants. For these children, 
territorial presence at birth remains an effective proxy for more 
substantive indicators of membership. 
The underlying principles I identified earlier in this 
article have persisted through various historical iterations of 
the question of who should be a citizen. That is, courts and 
legislatures have consistently focused on mutuality of 
obligation, community ties, and the need to preserve an 
egalitarian polity by avoiding the creation of a caste system. I 
propose that the same questions should be asked about the 
children of undocumented immigrants in order to evaluate 
whether a territorial conception of birthright citizenship 
remains an effective mechanism for distributing citizenship 
rights. Are these individuals subject to the obligations and 
burdens of U.S. law in a way that suggests they should be 
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offered corresponding protections? Do the children of 
undocumented immigrants have significant ties to their 
surrounding communities? Would a denial of citizenship to the 
children of undocumented immigrants alter the nature of the 
national community? 
A. Mutuality of Obligation 
With respect to mutuality of obligation, the answer is 
easy. From birth, the children of undocumented immigrants 
are very much subject to the obligations and burdens of U.S. 
law merely by their presence within the territory. Indeed, even 
their parents, who have no legal status in the United States, 
are likewise subject to those obligations. For example, 
residents, whether authorized or unauthorized, must register 
for selective service in the armed forces.177 Residents must also 
pay taxes, including state sales tax, income tax,178 and social 
security tax.179 Residents must obtain marriage licenses to 
marry, driver’s licenses to drive, and business licenses to 
conduct business.  
Opponents of birthright citizenship based on birth 
within U.S. territory might argue that undocumented 
immigrants do not, in fact, comply with these obligations. 
Frequently, for example, commentators raise undocumented 
immigrants’ alleged failure to pay taxes as an important 
  
 177 See 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (2011); see also Fast Facts: Who Must Register, 
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYS., http://www.sss.gov/FSwho.htm (last updated Apr. 11, 2013). 
Unlike individuals present in the United States as students or tourists, who do not 
have to register, immigrants who have taken up residency in the United States before 
turning twenty-six must register. See id. 
 178 In fact, though U.S. law distinguishes between resident and nonresident 
aliens by allowing nonresident aliens to pay taxes only on their U.S. source income at a 
rate negotiated by treaty with the alien’s home country, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 871, 894 
(2011); see also Alien Taxation—Certain Essential Concepts, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/ 
Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Alien-Taxation---Certain-Essential-Concepts (last 
updated Aug. 2, 2012), most undocumented immigrants are considered resident aliens 
by virtue of their long-term presence in the United States. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii). They therefore must pay income tax under the same rules that 
govern citizens living in the United States. See id.; see also IRS, Determining Alien Tax 
Status, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Determining-Alien-Tax-
Status (last updated Aug. 18, 2012); Substantial Presence Test, I.R.S., 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Substantial-Presence-Test 
(last updated Aug. 18, 2012).  
 179 Only non-resident aliens can be exempt from social security. Anyone 
employed in the United States must pay social security tax. See Aliens Employed in the 
U.S.—Social Security Taxes, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-
Taxpayers/Aliens-Employed-in-the-U.S.-%E2%80%93-Social-Security-Taxes (last updated 
Aug. 2, 2012). 
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consideration in any debate about immigration or citizenship. 
This, these commentators might argue, should weigh against 
U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants gaining 
citizenship at birth, since their parents have demonstrated a 
deliberate decision not to subject themselves to U.S. law. In some 
sense, the argument is one about an “election” of the type 
discussed in post-Revolution cases180—undocumented immigrants 
elect alien status for their children by failing to pay taxes. This 
argument, however, fails on several grounds. First, there is 
much evidence that undocumented immigrants do pay taxes.181 
Second, an individual who does not pay taxes remains subject 
to U.S. law and penalties, including fines and imprisonment, 
which exist to enforce those laws. Third, the failure to pay 
taxes cannot seriously be considered a rejection of U.S. 
citizenship on behalf of the child when so many other 
indicators suggest that the parents have elected membership in 
the United States for their children. Those same parents have 
borne their children in the United States, raised them in the 
United States, sent them to U.S. schools,182 and supported them 
by working in the United States.183 
Another argument against considering an individual’s 
subjection to U.S. law as a factor in citizenship determinations 
is that, under the logic of the mutuality of obligation rationale, 
virtually all residents, including undocumented immigrants, 
should immediately be granted citizenship. But this argument 
fails to consider that, first, this article discusses birthright 
citizenship. Assuming the desirability of birthright citizenship 
rules, I argue that a territorial conception of birthright 
citizenship most accurately measures, at birth, the substantive 
qualities that underlie American notions of citizenship. As a 
result, I only analyze these factors with respect to individuals 
  
 180 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
 181 See, e.g., John Lantigua, Illegal Immigrants Pay Social Security Tax, Won’t 
Benefit, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 28, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/ 
2017113852_immigtaxes29.html.  
 182 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229-30 (1982) (holding that undocumented 
children are entitled to the same free public education that their documented 
counterparts and citizens are entitled to). 
 183 Of approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants, 7.2 million are in 
the labor force, accounting for about 4.9% of the U.S. workforce. Broken down by 
gender, 94% of undocumented immigrant men and 54% of undocumented immigrant 
women work in the United States. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. (2006), 
available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. 
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born in the United States.184 Second, I do not propose that 
citizenship be granted to the children of undocumented 
immigrants based solely on their being subject to U.S. law at 
birth. As I argue below, their likelihood of developing ties to 
the surrounding community, as well as the risk that denying 
them citizenship will harm the national community, weighs in 
favor of granting birthright citizenship. 
B. Community Ties 
At birth, children have no meaningful community ties. 
They have no social ties or economic ties.185 Their first 
relationships are formed with the people who care for and feed 
them—their family. For the children of undocumented 
immigrants, however, birth in the United States is predictive of 
their development of community ties in the same way that—or 
perhaps even more than—it does for the children of authorized 
residents and citizens. Like the children of U.S. citizens in the 
United States, the children of undocumented parents are 
required and entitled to attend school.186 And like the children 
of U.S. citizens, the children of undocumented parents are 
likely to remain in the United States.187 Of course, some might 
  
 184 Immigrants, documented and undocumented, are instead subject to 
naturalization rules. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421 et seq. I would argue that the same 
principles, including mutuality of obligation, should guide the formulation of 
naturalization rules. 
 185 As a result, many commentators have treated children as prospective 
citizens rather than actual citizens at birth. See, e.g., DAVID CUTLER & ROGER FROST, 
TAKING THE INITIATIVE: PROMOTING YOUNG PEOPLE’S INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC 
DECISION-MAKING IN THE UK 8 (2001); Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough, 
Introduction, in CHALLENGING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
GENDER, EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 12 (Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough 
eds., 2000); Michael Wyness et al., Childhood, Politics and Ambiguity: Towards an 
Agenda for Children’s Political Inclusions, 38 SOCIOLOGY 81, 82 (2004); see also Ruth 
Lister, Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
IN LAW 693 (2007).  
 186 See Issues & Research: Compulsory Education: Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/compulsory-
education-overview.aspx (discussing state compulsory education laws). The requirement 
and obligation would exist regardless of citizenship. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982) (holding that all children, including undocumented children, must be offered the 
same free public education under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 187 Several studies show that geographic mobility is directly correlated with 
education levels and income. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICAN MOBILITY: WHO 
MOVES? WHO STAYS PUT? WHERE’S HOME?, available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
files/2011/04/American-Mobility-Report-updated-12-29-08.pdf (last updated Dec. 29, 2008). 
This would suggest that undocumented immigrants, who generally have little 
education and a low income, see JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, A PORTRAIT OF 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES iv (Apr. 14, 2009), available at 
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argue that if those same children were denied citizenship—that 
is, if they had no status in the United States—they would be 
less likely to remain in the United States. Research shows, 
however, that undocumented immigrants tend to remain in the 
United States for long periods of time.188 Moreover, because the 
Department of Homeland Security currently focuses on the 
deportation of “criminal aliens,”189 unauthorized immigrant children 
would be unlikely to face deportation. Of course, the longer U.S.-
born children remain, the more likely they are to develop greater 
ties to individuals and institutions in the United States. 
C. Community Preservation 
Finally, a strong argument exists that the denial of 
birthright citizenship to children of undocumented immigrants 
would inject an effective caste system, colored by issues of race 
and culture, into U.S. law and society. Many commentators 
have suggested that this concern alone weighs in favor of an 
  
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (finding that “[a]dult unauthorized 
immigrants are disproportionately likely to be poorly educated” and that the “median 
household income for unauthorized immigrants was $36,000, well below the $50,000 
median household income for U.S.-born residents”), would be less likely to move their 
families (whether it included citizen or alien children) out of the United States. This is 
especially so given the current bars to admissibility that are triggered by long 
unauthorized stays in the United States. Unauthorized presence for a continuous 
period of one year or more renders that individual, should she leave the country, 
ineligible to return to the United States for ten years. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
 188 PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS: LENGTH OF RESIDENCY, 
PATTERNS OF PARENTHOOD 3 (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
files/2011/12/Unauthorized-Characteristics.pdf. The Pew Hispanic Center reports that 
approximately 63% of undocumented immigrants have lived in the United States for at 
least ten years, and 35% have been in the United States for at least fifteen years. See 
id. Only 15% of the undocumented immigrant population has been in the United States 
for less than five years. See id. Nearly half of all undocumented immigrants are parents 
of minor children. See id. By comparison, only 38% of authorized immigrant adults and 
29% of U.S.-born adults are parents of minor children. See id. at 5. Of the current 
undocumented immigrant population in the United States, an estimated 1.2 million are 
under the age of eighteen and 1.29 million are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
four. See MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, at 5 (Feb. 2011), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.  
 189 See Memorandum from John Morton, Director, U.S. Immigr.& Customs 
Enforcement, to Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (June 
17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf (providing factors to consider in the enforcement of immigration law); 
see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226 (“[T]here is no assurance that a child subject to deportation 
will ever be deported . . . . In light of the discretionary federal power to grant relief from 
deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular undocumented child 
will in fact be deported . . . .”).  
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expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.190 I 
propose that, normatively, a territorial model is the most just 
system for distributing membership rights in the citizenship 
sphere. Individuals who live and work alongside each other 
should receive rights on the same terms to avoid the possibility 
that one group will become subject to the tyranny of another. 
Current proposals to deny citizenship to the children of 
undocumented immigrants191 would distribute membership 
rights on different terms to individuals who are effectively 
identical in all substantive respects. 
These proposals are not proposals to replace jus soli 
with jus sanguinis, although they are often labeled as such. A 
true jus sanguinis law of citizenship would offer citizenship 
only to the children of citizens, and it would deny citizenship to 
the children of aliens. Proposals to deny citizenship to the 
children of undocumented immigrants, however, also grant 
citizenship to the children of aliens who are legally in the 
United States. Children of legal resident aliens would thus be 
treated the same as children of citizens based on a territorial 
conception of citizenship: they would be subject to jus soli. The 
children of undocumented immigrants, however, would be 
excluded from this territorial notion of citizenship based on 
their parents’ immigration status. In essence, such proposals 
do not deny birthright citizenship based on a parent’s 
citizenship but rather on a parent’s violation of immigration 
law. Such punishment for a parent’s crime has no place in 
American law and would result in a class of U.S. residents who 
live, study, and work among citizens but are, nonetheless, 
subcitizens. The creation of this class would represent a 
significant departure from the egalitarian system of 
opportunity that is the hallmark of the U.S. legal system. 
  
 190 See, e.g., Nicole Newman, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 437, 448, 466-72 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Citizenship Clause, 
Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1363, 1365-68 (2009). 
 191 See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); A Bill to Amend 
the Immigration and Nationality Act to Limit Citizenship at Birth, Merely by Virtue of 
Birth in the United States, to Persons with Citizen or Legal Resident Mothers, H.R. 
126, 111th Cong. § 1 (2009); Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. 
§ 3(a) (2007).  
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Constitution makes little, if any, 
distinction between citizens and noncitizens, citizenship carries 
a great deal of meaning in the United States. For citizens, it 
confirms a sense of belonging, protection, and community. For 
noncitizens, it is the finish line that marks acceptance. 
Children of undocumented immigrants who are born in the 
United States are Americans by all substantive measures. 
They are raised and schooled here, and they are subject to our 
laws. They are at home in the United States.192 Proposals to 
deny citizenship to these children threaten to put their 
citizenship at odds with their identity as Americans. Perhaps 
more importantly, denying citizenship to children of 
undocumented immigrants threatens to put our sense of what 
it means to be a just, egalitarian community at odds with what 
it means to be an American citizen. 
As legislators consider citizenship, and as they 
reconsider the Fourteenth Amendment’s strong territorial 
flavor based on claims that too much has changed since the 
Amendment’s adoption, it is important to explore the historical 
rationales for grants of citizenship. Territoriality is worth 
abandoning only if its underlying rationales no longer apply. 
The rationales of territoriality still apply today in the context of 
citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants. 
  
 192 According to a Pew Research Center study, 60% of foreign-born adults in 
the U.S. consider the U.S. their “home,” while 26% of U.S.-born adults who have lived 
in more than one place say they consider their state of birth to be home. See AMERICAN 
MOBILITY, supra note 187.  
